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OHIO STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY.

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REPORT ON MONOMANIA:

—BY—

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LONDON, OHIO.

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Is there a MONOMANIA? Is there a *mania without delirium? without delusions?* An *Instinctive Mania?* Is there a *Reasoning Mania;* the *moral insanity* of Prichard? How are *instinct* and *intellect* related? Can a man be *insane* as to one idea, or fact, and *sane* as to all others? Can a a man be insane as to *instinct* and remain sane in intellect? Is *delusion* a *test* of insanity? Is "*Knowledge of right and wrong*" a just and sufficient test of *responsibility?*

Gentlemen of the Ohio State Medical Society:

Last year I directed your attention to a condition, or disease, alleged by many writers to be entitled to rank as a form of insanity, and which is, viewing it from their standpoint, of sufficient importance and distinctive characteristics to be designated a *monomania,* by name: DIPSOMANIA.

The views of any one writer upon the subject are brief, scattered, yet I collected them; presented my theory; and awaited the verdict of those who had given the subject special attention. The reception it met with is sufficient evidence that my labor was not fruitless.

The subject of Dipsomania involved many questions not considered in that Report; questions that are of great importance,

and upon which many views there entertained must rest. These questions are the foundation of all theories that attempt to maintain the existence of a monomania, or to explain it.

When we desire to explain the phenomena constituting any form of partial insanity, whether intellectual or moral, as the so called homicidal mania, instinctive, reasoning mania, *i. e.* the *moral insanity* of the English writers, or other form, we must first determine these questions; for no theory, the foundation of which rests upon them, is tenable until it is fully determined that it is grounded upon truth. A superstructure reared without solid foundation may humble and mortify its architect when storms of professional and scientific criticism assail it; but when well laid in clearly demonstrated truth, the superstructure may be reared to any height, and he who would cause it to topple and fall will but more firmly settle it upon its base. As we declared last year, follow the precept of Aristotle—determine whether a thing be so before you attempt to explain it—the *an sit* before the *cur sit.*

While I thus direct your attention to this rule that should govern all scientific investigation, it by no means follows as a consequence that I will reveal all the hidden mysteries of that incomprehensible union of body and mind—leave nothing to be considered worthy of attention—or even extend my research further than others have done, for I confess that finite vision is too limited to penetrate where Infinite vision alone can penetrate, where Infinite mind alone can comprehend and explain.

In my report upon DIPSOMANIA I called attention to the question raised by Pinel, and again excited by Fodere and others: "*Is there an insanity without delirium?*" In other words is not delusion the essence of insanity?

I remarked that this year I would discuss "mania with homicidal tendencies—instinctive and reasoning mania; the relation

of instinct to the mental faculties, and the part it plays in the instinctive or impulsive forms of insanity."

The questions I have presented embrace mainly these points, and although I cannot discuss them individually, yet I will endeavor to consider them as fully as if this were done—the close relation existing between them forbids all other consideration.

In my report upon GENERAL PARALYSIS I have remarked that, after hearing the family history and that of the patient, the first point to which a physician should direct his attention should be to the instinctive tendencies of the patient: whether instinct be normal, perverted, exaggerated, or as it were abolished.

No further explanation is necessary than to ask you to consider the nature and seat of instinct and its relation to the higher intellectual powers.

WHAT IS INSTINCT?

Cabanis, *Rapports du Physique et du Moral del' Homme*, defines instinct to be "those ideas produced by internal impressions, caused by excitation of internal organs; an act executed without a knowledge of the end or object, or without a consideration of the relation of the end to the cause, always employing the same means."

Thus each species of animals has its peculiar instincts, exercised only when called into activity by Nature's demands, as for defense, to gratify appetite, to perpetuate the species, and like acts purely instinctive, and which under a change of circumstances are unmodified by them to any great extent. Foxes avoid their pursuers as foxes ever have from the foundation of the world. Reason does not teach them when detected in the course they pursue to modify it.

Instinct is inborn—is not the result of education or experience further than this: animals may be taught many things—the education of one generation frequently becomes the instinct of the next. Animals generally perform instinctive acts as well at birth as at any subsequent period, with this modification, that their performance is more dependent upon the degree of development or maturity of the physical system of the animal than its associations or education.

Reid, *Intellectual and Active Powers of Man*, defines instinct to be "a natural blind impulse to certain actions, without having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do."

Laycock, Mind and Brain, vol. i, says: "Philosophers in speculating on the mental differences between man and animals, have attributed to the man *reason*, to the animal *instinct*. Hence, animals are irrational, men rational beings. Instinctive actions are not founded on knowledge or experience; rational actions are. Instinct is the *cause* inherent in animals of those proceedings on their part which take place, not only without experience as to the past, but without any conscious adaptation to accidental circumstances, and without any knowledge of the results to follow the course of proceeding. In short, in instinct there is what is termed a blind intelligence, *i. e.*, an intelligent adaptation of actions to ends, but without knowledge of the past, present, or future. * * * * "If we consider the meaning of the term Instinct, in its widest application, as manifesting a blind, unconscious adaptation to ends, the actions appropriate to nutrition or alimentation, and of respiration or æration of the tissues, are instinctive. The acts by which these objects are attained may or may not be associated with states of consciousness; and even when there is a concurrent feeling of pleasure or pain experienced by the organism, we observe that

there is coincident therewith only an aiding or intensification of the actions; the actions themselves are done independently of a knowledge of their order, or cause or object. And there are other processes of a similar kind, as to object, which are even more independent of mental states than these; for they are certainly performed without any consciousness whatever. Hence, instinct, in this more general sense, is a property of vegetable organisms as well as of man. It is therefore the supposed cause of all those acts which are performed either without any mode of consciousness absolutely—that is unconsciously; without any knowledge, on the part of the individual, of the ends to be attained by the acts; or without any volition. Thus Dr. Reid: 'He (a new born child) is led by nature to do those actions (*i. e.*, sucking, swallowing, &c.,) without knowing for what end, or what he is about. This we call *instinct*.' There is no word more commonly in use by everybody than this word *Nature*. * * * In this case Nature is but another word for instinct. Now the ultimate *fact* expressed in the word is order according to a law of design, without consciousness on the part of the thing ordered. In this sense Nature is but another term for life."

When we extend the meaning of the word to so general an application, we may embrace nearly, if not quite, all of our mental operations. But when we speak of mental operations that do not appear in consciousuess, with man, by which without a process of reasoning a conclusion is formed, we term it an *intuition*. This constitutes one of the essential elements of *genius*. It is a short cut that enables man to grasp truths that otherwise the most elaborate process of reasoning would oftentimes leave still beyond his grasp. It bears more resemblance to the intelligence of animals than that of man, for this reason, that it is the result of unconscious mental activity. The mind

is unable to recognize any process by which the conclusion arrived at is attained and unable often to afford a reason for the conclusion. It is this element in man which the world calls "common sense," "good judgment," &c., a judgment without reason, a conclusion without facts.

Animals indicate in the skill displayed in their labors the highest degree of intelligence—yet when we observe that each follows a definite course like his fellows, as that the bee never builds his comb like the wasp, or a hornet like a bee, that each bird of a species builds its nest as all others of that kind, of similar materials and in similar places and manner, that all animals whether possessed *apparently* of a high or low degree of intellectual power, obey the fixed and imperative laws of their being, we conclude, that if in obedience to reason the reasoning faculty is limited and that it always obeys a predetermined law.

That these laws are predetermined and not the result of experience, of education, or the exercise of reason or judgment, may be shown by the fact that a change of circumstances does not modify them. That they result from internal impressions may be shown by such facts as that at the period of the breeding season when the ovaries begin to enlarge the bird begins to build its nest, although deprived of a mate, as when caged. The male seeks its mate in obedience to the same law, and with the cessation of activity in the organs of generation, abandons her.

With the human being love seems to be to a great extent dependent upon similar conditions, for with the period of puberty comes the full matured passion—love. Whatever may be the reaction upon the intellectual centers, however pure and sincere the affection, however sentimental the individual, there is an unfelt irritation in the organs of generation—which at times becomes a conscious state—rendering it impossible for the

mind to be directed into other directions—it subdues to itself all the mental powers—and reason, reflection, imagination, Will, are only employed as servants of the irresistible impulse which impels man to gratify it to appease the desire. Thus the conditions with male and female by which individuals are forced to abandon themselves to their lusts are but modifications of natural instincts—conditions we observe in nymphomania, erotomania, onanism, &c; the local irritation of organs having been reflected so powerfully upon the brain that it yields and recognizes no other controlling power.

With the bird there is a law directing all its actions, the migratory species showing this in the highest degree. When the breeding season is over they gather together and as if by common consent wing their flights to other climes. This occurs before change of season warns of approaching cold weather sufficient to affect their comfort, and again they return only when they are secure from the fatal influence of winter. Instinct is to them a certain guide. Again, animals select such food as Nature determines. Nature determines so far as we can judge, all modes of activity with an animal, and it is no contradiction of this to say that the sense of smell or taste determines what an animal will eat or drink.

Thus, in the so often cited instance of Galen's kid, which when taken from its mother's womb drank milk when placed with other substances before it, in preference to them, after having examined them, it has been said the *senses* enabled it to decide which it should drink.

Who educated this sense of smell or taste so that from birth to death an animal will eat or drink only what will sustain its existence? Who educated its senses so that whatever may be the degree of hunger it suffers, it still will devour only its proper food? What but instinct governs this: what, when,

and the quantity it shall eat? The poet has observed all this and inquires:

> "Who taught the nations of the wood
> To shun their poison and to choose their food?
> Prescient, the tides or tempests to withstand;
> Build on the waves or arch beneath the sand?
> Who made the spider parallels design—
> Sure as De Moivre, without rule or line?
> Who bid the stork, Columbus-like, explore
> Heavens not his own and worlds unknown before?
> Who calls the council, states the certain day;
> Who forms the phalanx and who points the way?

Collineau, *Analyse Physiologique de l'entendement Humain Paris*, 1843, presents an extended consideration of the subject of Instinct. It is valuable as furnishing us a starting point from which we can extend our inquiries. He says: "The word *instinct* is applied to all internal movements, sensitive, intellectual, affective and moral, whether voluntary or involuntary, exercised without knowledge of the cause or nature of the action by the being which acts, the action being the immediate result of its organization and innate disposition.

In psychology instinct begins everything; it manifests itself with the first organic movements; it is a kind of intelligence communicated with life, and which develops itself more or less according to the degree of organization, the circumstances, and habits which facilitate it. With man, instinct is arrested or weakened as soon as we have an intimate perception or consciousness of our intellectual acts; *for this consciousness is the line of demarcation we place between instinctive acts and those o intelligence.* We say that *we have placed*, for this demarcation does not exist naturally, it is a mental conception. In reality instinct exists wherever there is intelligence, even where reason rules, and retires only as reason causes it to disappear. In no other way does it yield to reason.

"The internal movements of the organized body have limits

they rarely can pass; the organs have generally a determined relative volume; as the stature of man increases but little beyond a certain height, so it is with his mind. The great genius appears only at long intervals, and however well he may be guided and sustained by the labors of those who have preceded him, he cannot pass the limits placed by the period in which he lives, except in rare cases, only by emitting a few rays of light or impulses which resemble more instinct than they do intelligence, for we find in their works profound views, beauties, of which they are not themselves free from doubt, although the conception appears simple and natural.

"But that which proves better this last proposition is that when it becomes necessary to renew a work of a certain extent, which has escaped from the memory, they can never do it in the same manner, nor like in all points as it was before." This confirms, if true, what we have said concerning the intuitions of genius. Always as civilization extends, the force of individual intelligence increases, the material which feeds thought, which is digested and assimilated as mental food, becomes greater and more abundant, thought becomes more generalized, and co-ordination results in organized principles. Hence we would then expect intellect to be developed in a corresponding ratio beyond instinct, instinct, in abeyance, to be guided by intelligence, or supplanted by it.

But with man before intelligence is developed there is something that gives rise to action, there is something that directs and limits it when begun; it is not reason, it precedes intellect and exists with animals deprived of organs competent to construct or form a thought, animals not sufficiently developed to exercise reason; this is *instinct*.

Instinct controls to a certain extent our moral as well as physical and intellectual life,—we struggle with it continually,

and it is only when continued mastery of it has placed it in complete submission we are able to pass beyond its influences. This determines the moral life of an individual: his tastes, passions, appetites, habits, desires, propensities, and although from its very nature he is unconscious of it, his moral liberty is dependent upon it. It is that with which St. Paul continually warred; his reason teaching him that with fallen man, instincts, unless guided by Divine hand, are at enmity with good morals and religion. This applies to individuals; nations are but the aggregate of individuals—multiply individual history and you write that of nations.

Instinct is placed in man as a conservative power, protecting and preserving him. It is inseparable from organic life; it commands all movements, determines all actions, and requires the utmost freedom in all its manifestations when so controlling that which organic life is dependent upon; in the majority of instances where it presides directly over organic life there can be no restraint from intellect or impediment to obstruct its free exercise of power.

It is inborn; but not *infallible*. It is never wanting even with monsters; yet it is not wholly the result of organization, of sensibility, reason or will, for the condition of its existence is that it produces all, organizes all, directs all in the great ecomomy of nature.

Singular as it may seem, while conscious action is so apparent in the instinctive movements, yet nevertheless instinct is blind; it is an inherent principle of organic beings, developed in all organs, yet not the property of any organ; not a special sense, yet rises above the senses; absolutely essential to animal existence usurping the empire of reason, it directs the forces which intelligence can utilize and systamatize, thus becoming a power behind the throne, not only to shape individual character and

the fate of individuals, but through individuals the destiny of nations.

Will, the supreme executive power of the mind, cannot always resist instinct. Pain, the emotion expressive of injury or violence, may induce instinctive action—may appeal as a motive to the will: the will impelled by the irresistible motive yields obedience. We do not always do just what we wish, we do not always know beforehand what we are going to do, we sometimes, prompted by desire or emotion, do what we would not. The highest degree of intellectual development, the most perfect freeeom of the will gained by long exercise of its power, will not secure complete submission on the part of instinct. So clear is this that some writers regard instinct as the determining power of all thought, emotion, action; of our intellectual and moral nature. This we do not believe. We accept the assertion that instinct is felt in the domain of all our nature—but that conscious intellectual action is never instinctive action, although instinct may prompt the act. Still with our own consciousness of free action—our boasted free moral agency—how much of all our conscious life can we say is free from the directing power of instinct? We think of what we would not, we try to think of what we cannot, and learn at last that our best thoughts are spontaneous, surprising even ourselves with their force and clearness, unconsciously as it were, expressed. The will may require a train of thought —or direct the train of thought through the mind, holding it upon one subject, yet it is apparent that the thoughts expressed are co-ordinated by instinct, and that even as we write we know not when we write one word what the next shall be. It is then as if by inspiration man's best thoughts arise and flow from his pen, to his own consciousness appearing as if coming from a source beyond and higher than himself. There

may be intuitive conceptions of an end to be attained, yet in what respect does it differ from any instinctive act. How can we prove that we determined a thought by our own intellectual acts and volition, when we are unconscious before it is conceived that it will ever be the offspring of our brain? While man's mind thus guided by instinct may run on, he has power to direct his attention to it, turn it into other channels and thus thwart instinctive power.

THIS POWER TO CONTROL THE MIND—WITH CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH POWER, SEPARATES MIND FROM INSTINCT.

We pass a great portion of our lives thinking, without a knowledge of what we think, the cause that determined the train of thought, or the object of it. Our emotions are unconsciously excited, we see, unconsciously, the reality of all we think, and awake to consciousness as from a dream when attention fixes the mind upon its own operations. Metaphysicians say this is *reverie*; but that is only another term to express the fact that the mind has been left to itself—abandoned to its own instinctive forces. What have we in acute mania but this condition? The ideational centers (cortical substance), active by increased flow of blood, over stimulated, show exaggerated functional activity. The attention may be directed at times to the mental states, or operations of the mind, yet there is so profound lesion of the WILL that all is chaos and confusion. The state of internal organs, irritations within them, are reflected upon the brain—the brain already excited is at the mercy of a ceaseless train of thought, thoughts seemingly unfinished, crowding one upon the other. The very profusion of ideas forbids their being matured. Here is a condition analogous to reverie, and dreams, but to which the mind is seemingly abandoned. It has not power to

recognize clearly its own operations, to hold them in consciousness—or arrest, except when some powerful motive induces it, acting from without, this abnormal activity—we say there is insanity.

There is unconscious, instinctive action, and there is conscious action determined by the WILL, subject to reason. If it is beyond the power of the individual to arrest, as in the first, he is irresponsible—in proportion as the last obtains he is responsible.

Instinct bears this relation to reason: instinct is not actuated by conscious motive, has not consciousness of its own acts, of the motive that induce the acts, or the end, result or object of them. It is a blind adaptation of means to an end which is always accomplished in the same way. *Reason is instinct*, but much more; the mind is conscious of its own states, motives influence its operations, and the same result is seldom attained by precisely the same means. Reason modifies the means employed to suit the end to be attained. Instinct prompts man to gratify a passion or an appetite; reason teaches him when hurtful to refrain, and WILL commands obedience to reason. If there be a lesion of intellect passion may run riot —instinct may rule supreme; appetite, passion, and desire, may have no guiding or opposing force.

Collineau says: "the cause ought to include all that which is the effect." He says: "the principle of life includes latent sensibility, that is to say the cause, force, power that we suppose acts upon the organic elementary parts. Latent sensibility includes the principle of preceptive sensibility, in this relation, that it is the cause of the formation of the organization, by means of which this modification of general sensibility, this feeling with perception, is developed, and places us in connection with the external world as we are with ourselves.

The perceptive sensibility manifests the first appreciable acts of instinct, and instinct itself is now a degree more or less advanced of intelligence attached to the exercise of all the organic functions, as well as sensitive, intellectual, affective and moral; but still beyond the influence of conscience and WILL directed by reason.

In effect, what do we observe in the perfected organization, considered as a material and sensible being? Impulses determined by wants, desires, in a word by internal feelings, all instinctive. To what do these impulses tend? To perception—to distinguish the nature of these relations, to connect us with objects that can satisfy these desires or which excite them; to remove us from those which have not these qualities or which act in a contrary sense. It is the exercise of distinctive feeling and affective sensation.

But if, after these tendencies, these desires and sensations, we continue to act without consciousness and without reasonable volition; in the sense of the impulses which have produced them, or if we cease to act, we yet exercise instinctive action; we do, whatever it may be, that which pleases us, or cease to do that which displeases us. But instinct then becomes intelligence; for however feeble we suppose them to be there are in these determinations *judgment*, *memory*, *foresight*, and *volition*. In effect, if we continue to act it is because we find the thing good or proper, it is because we find the sentiment of well being manifested in what we experience, and that which we experience causes us to hope, desire, foresee and *will* the continuation of the same state. Thus there is an intelligence, or manifestation of intelligence, in all living, organized beings even when they act solely under the empire of instinct: because the order, because all their impulses, and above all those which relate to the preservation and propagation of the

species, are foreseen, co-ordinated and regulated in advance. But this intelligence is not the property of the animal, they have not acquired it, they are not conscious of their acts, and if they exercise them with desire, volition, and even sometimes with a species of reason, this reason and the determinations which result from it, are neither the fruits of experience, deliberation or choice incited by motive; they are not *free*. When even the animal does not act absolutely after his physical organization, he can neither will any thing nor reason otherwise; his intellectual impulses, determinations, and acts, are still instinctive. As soon as movements are practiced with consciousness and reasoning volition, that is to say, from the moment they are the result of acts felt, perceived, distinguished, compared, judged and willed, they cease to be instinctive, they **definitely fall under the empire of intelligence.**

It is then a fact which takes a new character from the moment when another fact is connected with it; thus such acts as were instinctive because performed without knowledge of their being performed (i. e. without consciousness) without having *willed* them, or having willed them without consciousness of it, become acts of intelligence from the moment we become conscious of what we do, from the moment we are conscious that we compare, judge, reflect, deliberate and choose.

Is it then in the first place this consciousness, this intimate perception of the instinctive act which gives it its intellectual character? Yes, the knowledge changes and modifies all, yet bears in itself the life and light of it; this knowledge, this intimate perception, is in itself, in its origin, but an instinctive fact. Intelligence is then born immediately from instinct.

But many as pass of our instinctive acts incessantly to the intellectual state, instinct is not lost; it is always the base of our first movements, that is to say, of those which fall not yet

under the action of consciousness, and have not been submitted to judgment, or reflection; instinct remains always and is the tie that connects all our intellectual acts to the vital principle and universal order."

Thus what becomes an intellectual act, or an act recognized by the mind, may arise simply as an instinctive impulse, and does not become an intellectual act until there is consciousness of it. By *consciousness* we mean that metaphysical term employed to signify the knowledge the mind has of its own actions. I shall not stop to discuss the multitude of questions metaphysicians raise concerning this function of the mind, whether it is a faculty of the mind, or the sum of all the faculties, or whatever it may be, it is sufficient to say that when the mind has knowledge of its own operations we say such operations are conscious actions. Thus I may read, turn a leaf, and at the same time am not *conscious* of the fact. If I read, *knowing* that I read, or perform any other act, with the mind directed upon it so that I *know* the act is performed, I say there is a consciousness of it.

No act of the mind, or mental state, is retained in memory unless the attention has been so fixed upon it that it is held up to the mental gaze in consciousness, and the more vivid the picture the more firmly is it impressed upon the retentive faculties—the more tenacious the grasp of memory. This may serve, also, as a distinguishing feature of intellect. Our fund of intellectual knowledge is acquired, and by memory preserved. Our *wisdom* is this fund elaborated—our ideas are drawn from it. Impressions made on the senses give rise to ideas—all are stored in memory and become the food of the mind—*wisdom* is this food digested and assimilated. *Knowledge is not wisdom.* A walking library repeats parrot like what he has learned—it flows out as it went in—crude, undigested, unassimilated mass-

es—without appropriation of it there is no mental growth. We cannot resist the temptation here to quote the poet Cowper, showing the contrast between cultivated, systematic, intellectual action, in a well developed and well disciplined mind, and the chaotic confusion of a mind that has only acquired, but has not passed beyond instinctive mental action to a degree of development sufficient to enable it to elaborate mental food—to metamorphose knowledge into wisdom.

"Knowledge and wisdom, far from being one,
Have oftimes no connection. Knowledge dwells
In heads replete with thoughts of other men;
Wisdom, in minds attentive to their own.
Knowledge, a rude unprofitable mass,
The mere material with which wisdom builds,
Till smoothed, and squared, and fitted to its place,
Does but encumber what it seemed to enrich.
Knowledge is proud that he has learned so much.
Wisdom is humble that he knows no more.
Books are not seldom, talismans and spells,
By which the magic art of shrewder wits
Holds an unthinking multitude enthralled.
Some to the fascination of a name
Surrender judgment hood-winked. Some the style
Infatuates, and, through labyrinths and wilds
Of error, leads them by a tune entranced.
While sloth seduces more, too weak to bear
The unsupported fatigue of thought,
And swallowing, therefore, without pause or choice,
The total grist, unsifted, husks and all."

Winter walk at noon.

This ability to elaborate ideas from impressions, to metamorphose these ideas into new forms, is the property only of *intellect*. Instinct acts in response to impressions without the higher intellectual operations.

There is one peculiarity of intellectual action that characterizes the lower instinctive acts. I mean the instinctive, unconscious tendency to imitation. We think in the same manner, reach the same conclusions, entertain the same opinions as others, by virtue of this instinct—imitation. All writers speak of it as showing its influence in extending nervous disorders. It

has been an unconscious power impelling its victims to crime, suicide and vice in all ages. We cannot rise above it. It is an instinctive principle of our nature. We call it *custom* and *habit* and everything else but *instinctive imitation*. It forms our opinions although we insist they are the result of our own intellections. Charron says: "Almost every opinion we have we have but by authority; we believe, judge, act, live and die on trust, as common custom teaches us; and rightly for we are too weak to choose for ourselves. But the wise do not act thus." It is but another expression of the same idea: our imitative, instinctive impulses guide us and reason never enters as a constituent of the act. Hommel says: "An ounce of custom outweighs a ton of reason."

Man is the unconscious tool of instinct—it is the motive—the secret spring of his *conscious* life. The contagious influence of custom in determining the prevailing form of insanity of any age has been recognized by all writers. Epidemic delusions rest upon instinctive imitation. Schiller has observed it with the sane mind:

> "Not that which proudly towers in life and strength
> Is truly dreadful; but the mean and common,
> The memory of the eternal *yesterday*,
> Which, ever warning, ever still returns,
> And weighs to-morrow for it weighed to-day.
> Out of the common is man's nature framed,
> And custom is the nurse to whom he cleaves.
> Woe then to him whose daring hand profanes
> The honored heir-looms of his ancestors!
> There is a consecrating power in time;
> And what is gray with years is Godlike,
> Be in possession and thou art right;
> The crowd will lend thee aid to keep it sacred."

But these men of wisdom, these men who do not cleave to custom, who are able to reason, who digest and assimilate and create, are often the last to act. They point the way of truth

to mankind but pursue an opposite direction themselves. Why? This strikes the key-note of reasoning mania.

The Will, Intellect and Sensibilities, are each distinct powers. Reason or intellectual action, alone, does not furnish a motive or impulse to action. Hence men of great reasoning powers frequently do not act, or if they do they are as liable to act contrary to what they teach as are other men. A man from his intellectual resources may draw out a most excellent theory, as upon temperance, his reasoning powers may electrify multitudes and yet he be a confirmed sot. The sensibilities are dormant—reason alone acts—the Will is uninfluenced. His reason has no connecting tie of emotion to incite volition. The sensibilities not being excited no motive is afforded to determine activity. The idea to be effective must not only be considered by the intellect but it must react upon the sensibilities.

Our theologians make a practical illustration of this every time they allege that men are convinced in their *reason* of the truth, yet refuse to give their *hearts* to God. In other words they recognize the fact that *reason* may assent to a proposition as right and yet the *feelings* be unmoved. Emotion may be excited and not the intellect.

Man may then reason profoundly upon any moral subject but unless his sensibilities are enlisted no action will result. Do not some religious denominations act upon this in time of revivals? All the appeals are made to the sensibilities—excitement follows—many from an innate power of instinctive imitation or sympathy flock to the altar? Why? The appeal has been made to the feelings alone. Under the impulse, reason not being influenced, the Will is overpowered. When the feeling subsides all subsides. This is all there is of it. If through calm and deliberate reason the sensibilities had been enlisted the work would have been more permanent.

When the sensibilities are enlisted, or appealed to a stronger influence even though this be born of the intellect may render this motive powerless, as an inordinate desire. The intellectual impression in the face of animal passion is unheeded.

The libertine—the gambler—the drunkard, at times, are all under the influence of reason and which too excites emotional activity, yet the motive or impulse derived from reason, with the return of the desire, is kept in abeyance, and sensation correlated in desire is the controlling power.

An appetite is but an uneasy sensation or feeling, giving rise to emotion—this reacts upon the intellect and there is consciousness of the state; when the Will is influenced a motive to action is afforded, an appeal is made to remove it. When the desire is stronger than the Will power it is obeyed from inability to do otherwise. The desire may appeal directly to the Will. Desire is an intermediate state between the sensation or impression and the exercise of the Will. Do not confound *desire*, an animal, instinctive impulse, with the Will. But we can proceed no further until we pause to consider the seat respectively of intellect, of sensori-motor action and of instinct.

If each has a different center from whence radiates its power —the sensorium being a bond of union as it were between organic and intellectual life we will be able to consider more fully the distinctive features of the two forces: mind, and vital or organic force as exhibited in the phenomena that characterize instinct and distinguish it from intellect.

The anatomical and physiological relations of the nerve centers of intellectual, *i. e.*, conscious life, and inorganic, explain many otherwise obscure phenomena.

Man is possessed of a double life: his vegetable growth and intellectual life. How are they related? Is one dependent upon the other? Do they react upon and modify each other? Which holds the scepter?

The seat of the intellect is the cerebral hemispheres; instinct finds itself seated in every ganglion of the ganglionic system, its force and character being dependent upon the stability of the ganglion in which it is located, but its special manifestation is determined by its natural endowment, by the conditions and circumstances under which it acts, each ganglion being a brain for the part in which it is located and endowed by nature with such special function as that locality requires. Instinct bears the same relation to the vital powers that conscious intellectual life does to mental power. That is each is the offspring of its respective force.

We are unable to perceive any essential difference between the operation of a law of nature that molds and shapes a crystal from its mother liquid, always after a given form, and that which fashions the plant, limits its growth, forms its organs, as well as those of man, and determines their functions. Why albumen should assume the form of muscle in the animal, or the form it assumes in the egg, why some portions of matter form a tiny animalcule and yet others the huge leviathan of the deep—why the same chemical elements combine to constitute different species of animals, the God of Nature who put in operation these laws alone can explain.

Different parts of the human body are all formed from the same circulation—the same blood current. The epithelial cell of one part selects what shall be appropriated to nourish that part—of another what pertains to its sustenance. Is not this an instinctive force with which the cell is endowed? The cell structure of a gland is likewise endowed with power to select what shall, when combined and elaborated, constitute its proper secretion. Is this power of a lower order than that which directs the bird in selecting the proper material for its nest? Metals crystalize always after as definite forms, each as peculiar to and

characteristic of its kind, as the development of animals and plants. The laws governing one govern all—it is not the work of chance—all are predetermined, the unseen blind force is directed by the Divine Architect, who molds and fashions and brings into unity and harmony all created things.

Does it require any more faith—any greater stretch of the imagination to see the same law operate in the inanimate that operates in the animate being? Cannot he who has endowed man with consciousness delegate power to matter? Cannot He who has ordained conscious action in the mind of man delegate to, or confer upon matter unconscious activity? But matter has no active power conferred upon it, it obeys only the operation of the forces that are resident in it. What then is this force? We say *vital* force constructs a heart with valves, a brain with convolutions, a liver or stomach with secreting structures; how does this differ from the force that is resident in matter—if different, what organizes a plant and what shapes a crystal? What difference is there between the instinct that prompts the animal to quench its thirst at the spring and that which causes the root of a plant to deviate from its course to drink from the same source, or the limb of a plant to bend in its growth that its leaves may be exposed to the light of the sun?

From the lowest order of Nature to man the same law governs, and is manifest in its various modifications of energy and character as the conditions of organization and function require Intellect is superadded, as an extension of this power, yet with a power not inherent to instinct, not a property of instinct: that which renders man a rational, responsible being: CONSCIOUSNESS OF HIS ACTS, with reason, judgment, memory and Will, to enable him to consider, determine, act or refrain from acting.

The ability to do or refrain from doing, is as we have remarked,

to a great extent dependent upon the animal nature—freedom of Will is freedom from the tyranny of instinct, of desire and passion which instinct represents.

If intellect is seated in the brain and instinct in the ganglia of organs, how can this be?

The brain, as every other organ of the body, has its life of vegetation and that of function. In this respect it is as dependent upon the vital forces controlled by instinct as all other organs of the body. The brain is not an independent center, but only one great ganglionic center of the myriad that dot the body, fill organs and everywhere preside over their respective locations, exceeding all in size, and endowed with a special function: INTELLECTION.

The brain has its wants, manifest in desire, arising from nutrition, it may be reacted upon or react upon other organs. We have then from the lowest to the higher powers, first *vital force*. It is something imparted to all organized beings, for when withdrawn they become disorganized. We have above this, *instinct*, which is the mind of vital force—then intellect.

All are too familiar with the anatomy of the nervous system to render it necessary that I should refer to the distribution of the different sets of nerves, to show the intimate relation existing between every part of the nervous system.

The ganglionic, or sympathetic system, consists in one or more cells, scattered upon or in the tissues of every organ of the body, a knot or collection here and there giving it the peculiar character expressed by the name ganglionic. When the collection is large, of both cell and fiber, it is called a *plexus*. There is a net-work over all the body, the ganglia—signal stations—transmit to the brain—or allow to be transmitted only messages warning of danger. They act as centers of power to the vegetative function and arrest in a normal state all communication.

The chief ganglia are those of the head, as the opthalmic, Meckel's or the Spheno-palatine, the otic, and submaxillary; the neck, the cervical ganglia; extending along the side of the vertebral column, right and left, in front, as a double chain, we have the prevertebral ganglia; upon the posterior roots of the spinal nerves there is a similar chain.

We shall not stop to discuss the question whether these ganglia upon the roots of the spinal nerves have a special function, to modify or *arrest* impressions coming from internal organs; whether they come between internal organs to modify impressions as do ganglia of special sense. This you may determine for yourselves.

Within the abdomen and thorax the principal ganglia are the *cardiac*, *solar*, and *hypogastric* plexuses. Added to these are numerous smaller ganglia, situated upon the viscera, and which are additional centers of nerve power, reinforcing the larger centers. The nerve trunks of the sympathetic are made up of fibers from both the vesicular matter of the cerebro-spinal and the ganglia of the sympathetic. Their fibers have their central termination in both systems, some arising in the ganglia, others passing out through the anterior roots from the spinal cord. The fibers from the sympathetic interpenetrate those of the cerebro-spinal in the roots of both the anterior and posterior nerves. Those fibers derived from the ganglia, which enter the anterior and posterior roots of nerves upon the spinal cord, having their central end in the ganglia, are of the "gelatinous" form or non-medullated. Those derived from the cerebro-spinal system are of the "dark bordered" or tubular form. Thus each system has its distinct fibers which are so blended that both are distributed together.

This system of nerves supplies the blood vessels, and presides over organic life; some portions of the body *receive no*

other supply of nervous power. The muscular coats of the intestinal canal from the stomach downward, with the ducts from the glands which open into it, that which forms the walls of the bladder, of the uterus, ureters, the fallopian tubes and muscular coat which governs the size of blood vessels, *receive no nerves except from the sympathetic.* Independent cells are imbedded in the walls of the heart, uterus and intestinal tract, forming centers of power independent of and free from cerebro-spinal influence.

The ganglia of the sympathetic system are not endowed with a high degree of sensibility, in fact some writers deny that they are possessed of sensibility at all, yet severe suffering arises from disease or irritation of them. Irritation is transmitted through their cerebro-spinal trunks, and hence the brain manifests its inhibitory influence. Irritation in an organ may thus be reflected upon the brain, another organ, or generally diffused through the body.

Irritation of an organ, as the liver, is transmitted through the sympathetic trunks, which also include the cerebro-spinal, to the vaso-motor centers; from thence may radiate influences that paralyze the vaso-motor nerves of other organs. The vaso-motor system has centers wherever there are ganglia, but the chief centers are in the cord and brain. Schiff, Salskowsky, Ludwig and Thiry, locate the vaso-motor center for the whole body in the medulla oblongata. Tscheschichin located it at the junction of the pons varolii and medulla. Brown-Sequard extends it up to the cerebellum and cerebrum. Kronecker locates it in the floor of the fourth ventricle. This seems most reasonable, for here in close proximity, are the motor and special sensory centers, which lie in the medulla oblongata, pons varolii, and base of the brain. The intimate relation between the centers of the ganglia of special sense and the vaso-motor centers

as thus described would explain the sudden reflex action of blushing, or the opposite, extreme paleness, or violent and sudden changes manifest in reflex actions. Dr. Jewell, *Chicago Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, in an article upon the Pathology of the vaso-motor nervous system sets forth these facts very clearly.

To recapitulate, in formulas, what we have considered, we find that we have encountered with man, as it were, three principles, powers, or *forces:*

1. *The vital force.* Natural force as exhibited in all Nature's operations by which all organizations are perfected whether animate or inanimate.

2. *Instinct.* The same force manifested in a higher degree. The general action of organic nature; the phenomena having their origin in organic action; the phenomena by which nature manifests her wants, and the impulses that cause her creatures to seek the preservation and reproduction of their species, co-ordinating muscular action to this end.

3. *Mind: Intellect.* A power superadded to instinct and belonging only to rational, responsible creatures; that which characterizes individuality and enables man alone to become conscious of his personality; that which enables him alone to comprehend his instinctive tendencies, to know God's laws, and confers upon him ability to perform the duties enjoined therein.

All of these may exist in one individual or one or more may be wanting. Thus man may exist in the simple vegetative state, as a parasite, nourished by the maternal circulation with complete absence of the cerebral system; the ganglionic, or nerves administering to vegetative life alone being developed to any considerable extent; he may live only as an animal, controlled wholly by instinct, devoid of reason, as in idiocy and in some forms of insanity; he obeys his instinctive impulses, and is be-

neath the brute when these forces are perverted; or man may represent all that nature has conferred upon her most perfect creatures: vegetative, instinctive, and intellectual, or moral life Before his fall, in the full enjoyment of all of his faculties, these existed in harmony; man enjoyed full and entire liberty in his thoughts and actions—*free will*. His mental and moral life being dependent upon the integrity of his organization, his animal life, he enjoys freedom of will only in proportion as his organization is perfected, and every part operates in harmony. By this we do not mean to say man is in no way, and under no conditions responsible, since the fall. He can obey vicious impulses, yield to his instinctive feelings, excite by mental effort vicious sensations, and through them when excited, be reacted upon by sensual impulses.

He can repress, when they arise, voluptuous sensations, instinctive impulses, appetites, passions, and if he conquers they retire and in many instances leave him master of the field. His will gains strength at each success—the appetite or passion is correspondingly weakened. Instinctive impulses, appetites or desires, unheeded, in time rust out, or die from inactivity.

Leaving out the question of vital force, of which *we* believe instinct is but a modification, we have man ruled by two antagonistic forces, *instinct* and *reason*. We say *antagonistic*, not because they never unite to accomplish the same end, but because they less often act in concert, or else one becomes the servant of the other.

Two sets of nerves we have called your attention to, as ministering to each of these powers, the cerebral and ganglionic. Intellectual force depends upon the due development and nutrition of the cerebrum. Instinct is dependent upon the same conditions of ganglionic structure; while man can live deprived of intellect, he cannot if deprived of instinctive force. This

being accepted, is it strange that organic life, instinct, instinctive appetites subdue intellect and dethrone the *will*?

Man enters upon life with only instinctive life to control him —instinct directs all his actions. As he develops into manhood those forces have supremacy that are most cultivated and developed. What in early life is but an instinctive appetite, if cultivated becomes a powerful passion. Passion thus developed reacts upon the organism, and mind and will power succumb. Passion may also react upon the brain so changing its vegetative life, that what at first was but an impulse communicated by an organ becomes a power to control imagination, reason, and the will. There is organic lesion which renders a return to a normal moral state impossible. Is it necessary to enter into details to show how man's stomach or generative functions subdue to themselves every other force of his nature?

Comprehending the distribution of ganglionic nerves as we do, is it difficult to understand why an irritation in the intestinal tract, uterus, or other part supplied only by this system of nerves, may give rise to ill-defined sensations, general lassitude, depression, melancholy, hypochondriasis? When a normal instinctive impulse, as an appetite, communicated to the brain is recognized, whether arising from the general state of the system, as hunger, thirst; or from local sensation as the sexual passion; instinct co-ordinates organic action, and muscular action in the line of the impulse. This may be fully proved with the lower animals, as the frog, which are governed wholly by instinct. Consciousness, that function superadded to instinct, enables man to determine the source of all natural, instinctive impulses, although their existence is not dependent upon intellectual development. His organs of special sense, reason and judgment, affirm the existence of instinct to consciousness. Without stopping to discuss the question *whether consciousness is a true wit-*

ness, we affirm that consciousness attests all mental operations; whether conceptions be true or false, *it will not determine the grounds of belief.* But an irritation arising in an organ, it likewise may be reflected upon the cerebral centers, and give rise to ideas. It will not appear in consciousness, except there be pain or pleasure; then the source is not made known. It is not an instinctive impulse, is not the result of impressions upon the organs of special sense. The ideational centers receive it as they would impulses of an unnatural or foreign source, as when the electric current excites a ganglia of special sense. The source of the pain or uneasiness is made known only when it becomes so well defined, so localized, as to become subject to the organs of special sense, through their exercise reaching the intellect. But when the irritation is *unfelt* yet equally positive in effects upon the ideational centers, it is otherwise.

The appetites are the true instinctive manifestations, and appealing to the will for gratification give rise to *desires. Perversion* of these sensations gives rise to the various *instinctive manias.* This is an explanation of our assertion, that Dipsomania is but a physical condition, an exaggerated or perverted instinctive impulse.

We cannot pause to consider the relation of the organs of special sense to the ideational centers, the physiology of the sensorium, sensori-motor function, the manner in which illusions and hallucinations may arise, belief in the reality of which constitutes delusions. It is sufficient to say impressions made upon the sensorium may give rise to sounds, voices, visions, tastes, or smells; these carried to the ideational centers may when reaching consciousness appear in material forms, or in other words will be associated with material objects which the imagination furnishes. When these impressions reaching the sensorium, or ideational centers are from without, that is, made by an external

object, of which there is a false conception of the impression made, as for instance, one seeing a post imagines it to be a man, we say there is an illusion. The appearance upon a moving railroad train that everything is running backwards is an illusion. When a man perceives an object that has no existence except in his imagination, as in delirium tremens when the patient sees the floor covered with rats, serpents, &c., this being the result of irritation in his organs, we say there is an *hallucination*. When the mind is able to correct these false impressions and recognize its own states, we say it is sane. Belief in the reality of these false impressions constitutes what we term *delusion*. When the mind is unable to recognize its error, believes in the reality of the illusion or hallucination, there is insanity. The mind having been subjected to this condition, so that there is well manifested delusion, it is as fully under its influence as when belief is the result of normal action. When the mind of the patient is so affected that he is unable to reason against his delusion, or being reasoned with by others is incapable of accepting the evidence of others against the evidence of his own senses, there is unquestionable insanity. The true lesion of intellect in these cases consists in the want of ability to reason against the delusion, or the evidence of the senses. In other words reason is not influenced by any impression made upon the senses unless in the line of the delusion, *i. e.* not contrary to it. Let us illustrate this by a few cases in which delusion was the result of real impressions, but false conceptions, giving rise to false ideas.

Dagonet relates the case of a patient who could not be convinced that a serpent had not taken up its residence in his belly. A post mortem examination revealed the fact that two ulcers existed in the stomach, one of which had perforated it and caused the patient's death. The case of a woman is reported

who believed that a regiment of soldiers was concealed in her abdomen. A post mortem examination revealed the fact that chronic inflammation had glued the intestines together, although unsuspected before death. Another case in which the same idea existed there was found a fibrous uterine growth. As we have remarked, impressions transmitted to the ideational centers give rise to ideas. It is not even necessary that the irritation, or impression made upon an organ be felt, to cause ideas to arise. Patients in health believe the evidence of their senses, but if their senses deceive them, or internal impressions are made, which come to the brain with all the force and authority of those of special sense, and ideas arise, there will be undoubtedly delusion.

Any appetite, or instinctive function, may be perverted. Thus man may lust after his fellow man, he may thirst for blood, he may desire human flesh. Organic changes determine these instinctive insanities. A good case illustrating this is that of the boy *Bijou*, who was in a menagerie at Paris. He drank on one occasion, in 24 hours, thirty livres of blood, stole pieces of putrified anatomical specimens and devoured them; devoured also a dead lion.

A glutton named Tarare, born in 1772, weighed at seventeen 100 lbs., could eat in 24 hours his weight of beef. He devoured living cats and dogs; he ate at one meal a dinner prepared for twelve men. After entering the hospital at Soultz, in Alsace, he ate the cataplasms, plasters, blood from the leeches, and even was caught at the amphitheater eating of the dead bodies. A child of fourteen months disappeared under very suspicious circumstances. He died in 1798, at Versailles, in a state of complete marasmus, under the influence of a purulent, chronic diarrhœa. A post mortem examination showed the intestines glued together, suppuration, an enormous putrid liver, and a stomach which occupied a large portion of the abdomen.

Cases might be cited illustrating the influence of thirst upon the system and its mastery of intellect. Organic changes induce these perverted instinctive manifestations, as in diabetes, chronic diarrhœa, &c., as well as in those of a purely instinctive character not associated apparently with disease, as dipsomania, &c.

The books are full of cases we might cite to illustrate our views but you can apply them at your leisure.

Disease of the brain may give rise to all the manifestations we have mentioned due to organic changes at remote parts.

Will these irritations, either in the brain or in organs remote, give rise to one idea or will the delirium be general? We have already seen that the idea correlating the impression may not be complex, but a simple idea, limited to a single fact, which, however, controls the mind in respect to all that pertains to the reality of this fact. Every mental faculty is enlisted in support of it. It is then a monomania.

But the fact that every mental faculty is enlisted in the support of the idea, or train of ideas, is used by those opposed to the theory of a monomania to prove the whole mind is insane. This will be correct if we believe the mind never thinks upon one subject independent of all others, and we also ignore the physiology of ideation. The fact that generally the delirium is more universal does not prove that an impression may not result in a single idea. The cause remaining, the conditions being unchanged, *the idea is fixed*. Where a multitude of varying impressions reach the cortical substance there will be corresponding variableness of delusions resulting therefrom; but whether the *impression* is local, *i. e.* in the brain, or remote, or what its nature, we may not always be able to determine from the phenomena consequent upon its action.

Instinctive appetite may not affect the intellect; it may sub-

due it. As we remarked concerning dipsomania, the imagination, when the impulse to drink is given by the organs, may supply pleasant visions of that which in imagination will appease the desire. We can scarcely conceive of an appetite or desire that is not personified in the imagination. The intellect then becomes servant to the instinctive impulse and instead of thwarting begins to devise means of gratifying the desire, when this results there is, the instinct being exaggerated or perverted in its operation, instinctive mania.

We have these two facts then established beyond dispute:

1st. That an impression made in the brain by local irritation, in the sensorium, or in remote ganglia, or parts supplied by the sympathetic, when such impressions reach the cortical substance, may each originate an idea or single train of ideas which will control the mind in the line of such ideas; the mind being unable to correct these false ideas, delusion exists—the individual is a monomaniac.

2d. That any instinct may be exaggerated, perverted or abated. That the Intellect and Will may be controlled by and yield obedience to it, yet preserving unimpaired reasoning power even as to this instinct; approving or condemning as the same faculty may be exercised upon all other questions; the individual being powerless in the grasp of his instinctive impulses.

Thus in gluttony, and in disease, the instinctive desire, hunger, may cause excessive quantities of food to be taken; the same instinct, perverted, may cause the most loathsome and disgusting substances to be devoured; if abated no food will be taken, as in fever, melancholia, &c. Refusal to take food may also be in the line of the delusion, as where the patient conceives the idea that he is too wicked to live and desires to starve himself to death. The same cause that abates the instinct gives rise to the idea. The idea rules in intellectual monoma-

nia, the instinct in instinctive insanity. The idea may be born of the instinctive condition. The perversion may be only that of instinct, hence there may or may not be delusion, the fact depending wholly upon another fact, whether the intellectual centers are involved; whether an impression sufficient to create a delusion has been made.

In all cases instinct co-ordinates muscular action in the line of any instinct. All special senses that may be necessary to serve any special instinct, as sight, smell and taste, are equally under the control of instinct.

Man is so constituted that the greater portion of his life is simply to follow the dictates of his instincts. The more he develops his intellect the more instinct is dethroned.

Has the animal intellect? From what we have said of the relation of instinct to intellect you may infer that we believe it has not. This is not correct. All animals possessed of a cerebrum have a certain degree or kind of intellect. As we have declared, however, it is so closely related to instinct we are unable to separate them. An animal performs many acts that indicate a reasoning faculty that are purely instinctive—man does the same. There is one fact that convinces me beyond all others that animals possess a low degree of intellect: removal of the cerebrum produces the same effect that it does with man. It reduces the animal to the condition of a man in a profound sleep. There may be sensori-motor actions excited, yet if we subsequently awaken the man he is not conscious of the act that was excited. The brain of the animal seems to be but the servant of its instincts, and if possessed of a higher endowment than this its action is so co-ordinated by instinct that we can recognize no trace of mind but by phenomena that are *apparently* mental, we cannot prove them to be such.

Can man be reduced to this level? Can intellect be so in

abeyance to instinct that we recognize only instinctive action? When delusion exists is it a test of insanity? Must delusion exist to constitute insanity? To what extent is it a test of insanity?

DELUSION IS THE LEGAL TEST OF INSANITY.

"Knowledge of right and wrong" has been the test, as held by Hale, and still held in some States of our Union. *It is a test of responsibility but not of insanity.* A man who has not knowledge of right and wrong is irresponsible, but three-fourths of all who are insane are able to distinguish right from wrong.

Wharton* lays down the principle as follows:

"1. Any species of insane delusion exempts from punishment the perpetrator of an act committed under its influence.

"2. The belief, unfounded in fact, that a party is in immediate danger of his life from another, may be such a delusion.

"Or the belief that taking the life of another is the appropriate remedy for a minor though imagined evil, may be also an insane delusion.

"3. Therefore homicide, under such a delusion, is not liable to punishment." This echoes the English cases of like nature.

Wharton, (in W. & S. 52 Sect.) says: "The delusion however, must go to the root of the crime; or, in other words, the crime must have been the result of the delusion."

In vol. vii, 1863 Abbot's N. Y. Digest, it is said: "The true test of insanity is *mental delusion.* If a person persistently believes supposed facts which have no real existence except in his fevered imagination and against all evidence and probability, and conducts himself, however logically upon the assumption of

*Held in recent English decisions.

their existence, he is, so far as they are concerned, under a *morbid delusion; and delusion in that sense is insanity.*"

Greanleaf, Ev. i, p. 464, says: "What constitutes insanity of mind is a question which has been very much discussed, especially of late years; and the opinions of learned judges seem at first view to be conflicting; but much of the apparent discrepancy may be reconciled by adverting to the nature of the cases respectively in judgment. The degree of unsoundness or imbecility of mind, sufficient to invalidate the acts of the party in some cases may not suffice in others. But in regard to insanity, where there is no frenzy or raving madness, *the legal and true character of the disease is delusion*; or as physicians express it, illusions or hallucinations; and the insane delusion consists in a belief of facts, which no rational person would believe."

This applies to monomania as well as general mania. In monomania the idea is fixed, in general mania the delusion is variable.

It is, by the above, but another term for insanity to use the word delusion; but as we believe there may be insanity of action as well as of thought we do not think it proper to limit insanity simply to mental phenomena. We believe there may be insanity of muscular action, as in chorea, subsultus tendinum, &c; there may be insanity of any part of man's nature.

Bucknill defines insanity: "Insanity therefore may be defined as, a condition of the mind in which a false action of conception or judgment, a defective power of the will, or an uncontrollable violence of the emotions and instincts, have separately or conjointly been produced by disease."

The test of delusion was first laid down by Lord Erskine, in his defense of Hadfield for shooting at King George III, in Drury Lane Theater, in the year 1800.

Previous to that Lord Hale's doctrine, "Knowledge of right

and wrong" had prevailed. This was held in the celebrated McNaughton case, partial delusion, (*i. e.* partial insanity) was held to be no defense.

In the Blackburn case,* 23 O. S. R., the Supreme Court held: the defendent must be able to distinguish right from wrong—*must be a free moral agent.* Here two distinct tests are submitted; yet where both are given it would seem that either would exculpate. *Knowledge* of right and wrong is one thing, but the *ability* to do right is another, dependent upon *power,* not knowledge, hence the man who from lesion of the Will has not ability, bears the same relation to the law as he who has not knowledge. This is the test of *responsibility* and cannot justly be considered the test of all forms of insanity.

Delusion has been considered a test—yet it is not a true test further than as we consider the intellect. An error may arise in sensation, giving rise to a delusion, yet it is only in the relation such sensation may sustain to reason and judgment that we can consider it as bearing any relation to insanity.

The condition termed formication may induce me to believe something moves over the surface of my body, my senses enable me to correct this impression. The man with delirium tremens suffers similar sensations—sees hideous objects, reason and judgment are insufficient to correct the error. The sensation then gives rise to delusion. Delusion may arise as well from an unrecognized as from a recognized irritation. If it works the same change in the intellectual centers the result will be the same.

Actions are the offspring of belief. As we believe so we act. The delusion of the insane is to him a reality. In the abstract he may reason well—even against his delusion if brought before him in an abstract form, yet when the delusion becomes a

*See Blackburn Case at end of my report on General Paralysis.

motive for action he no longer reasons against it. His abstract reasoning—the intellectual act—seems to bear no relation to the act springing from his sensibilities. We may not be able to connect any given act with delusion so as to show it to be unquestionably the offspring of delusion. The reasoning power of a maniac is oftentimes so perverted that what seems to flow, to him, as a logical consequence, to another bears no relation whatever to the alleged motive. He views it from his standpoint and the process of reasoning by which he reaches a conclusion cannot be determined—in fact many times conclusions arise without premises—without reason—the delusion is deeply rooted in the mind—is a motive to action and the party is wholly unable to explain it. Hence where one insane commits an act that seems to indicate responsibility we should be extremely cautious, and err, if we err, upon the side of mercy.

Bucknill says: "The existence of delusion is the proof of insanity; and an acknowledged lunatic cannot justly be held to be wholly responsible for his actions, whether we are able to trace the motives for them to delusive opinion or not."

In true homicidal insanity no sufficient motive can be assigned for the act committed. A sudden, irresistible impulse seizes and overpowers the Will. The intellect if employed is but a servant to the instinctive thirst for blood. It is a terrible power converting intelligent man into the ferocious beast—exaggerating the element of destructiveness until at times he would slay all within his reach.

This emotional state may be induced by irritation of organs remote from the brain, or by disease of the brain itself. It will most generally be found to be the result of physical derangement not located in the brain. Many cases reported seem to be the result of menstrual irregularity, or follow parturition, or are determined by some local eccentric irritation that induces a

condition of the sensorium more closely allied to that observed in many cases of *petit mal* than anything else.*

Instinct plays an important part in all these cases. Intellect and Will are in abeyance. All acts are sensori-motor. There is a sudden impulse, but the revulsion of feeling when the impulse is obeyed is as sudden. The act may be a conscious one or not. If the mind recognizes the act it is unable to comprehend fully its nature. There is a condition with many like that which induces suicide. I would need to waste no words to convince you that there is a condition that irresistibly compels a man to destroy his own life. What difference is there when instead of being turned upon himself he is forced to kill another?

Hundreds of cases may be cited to prove that men not to any great extent intellectually deranged take their own lives. Sensibility reigns—the Will is dethroned. I acknowledge that the mind may be deranged and yet be *apparently* sound, yet no one who has a thorough understanding of the relation of the emotions to the intellect and to the Will will doubt this assertion.

I am fully convinced that there is a homicidal mania—that there is an instinctive mania—that the lesion of mind is the enthrallment of the Will—that where the intellect suffers it is only through this powerless state of the Will.

It is a question much discussed whether these conditions—instinctive and homocidal manias—can exist without lesion of the intellect.

If I thrust a pin into a man he immediately strikes me and considers the act only after it has been performed. He then may regret it. The Intellect and Will are not involved—it is a sensori-motor act. Cannot local irritation in an organ determine a similar act, and if sufficiently strong induce it even in

*I omit here several pages in consequence of the great length of these papers.

the face of full consciousness? Can these conditions of sensori-motor function exist without lesion of the intellect? Must there be lesion of the intellect in homicidal mania?

It can; the will alone yielding to the emotional impulse.

Is there a *reasoning* or *moral* mania?

We think these questions have been fully determined.* The appetites, passions, desires are but determined forms of instinctive action—instinctive impulses arising from different states of the ganglionic system of nerves. As we have before remarked *reason alone* does not afford a motive to action. Instinctive impulses do; reason may comprehend the situation; man may feel the disgrace his condition causes, his interests may appeal to him, his friends may appeal to him, his senses may appeal to him, his moral sense, knowledge of right and wrong may enter a protest, yet all this but lessens his self-esteem, he feels his degradation more and plunges headlong into the gulf beneath his feet that he may drown conscience. He is the slave of his instincts. * * * *

We omit eight pages of our consideration of moral insanity. These patients manifest strange perversion of the affections, sensibilities, and often unusual brilliancy of intellect when directed in certain courses: thus they may be great musical performers, but not original composers; they are active in every thing, superficial in everything, continue long in nothing. They are impulsive, conceited, proud. They love change and are constant in nothing except that they are constantly inconstant. They lie with a readiness that is startling, exaggerate everything they relate; the slightest emotion animates and exalts them. They are easily angered, pass readily from one extreme to another; approve to-day what they condemn to-morrow; noth-

*See *Traite de la Manie*, *Paris*, 1869 by Dr. Campagne, &c., &c.

ing influences them so much as flattery. Their word of honor is of no value; they fail to keep the most sacred promises, and excuse all their actions on the ground that "it is of so little consequence," feeling no sense of responsibility whatever in all they do or say. They steal a book or other article if it takes their fancy, soon tire of it and require some other object. Often they are brutal, unfeeling—inflict pain on others without remorse. Their reason teaches them they must respect the rights of others to avoid punishment; their observance of law whether human or Divine is based on no other principle than self-interest. *Duty* is a term unknown. Naturally jealous they envy every one happiness or prosperity and seem happy only when causing unhappiness. Although they boast, they are cowards; bold in speech, cowards in action. They are always planning but never execute; their fickle natures, their love of change render steady occupation impossible. They are lawyers, physicians, chemists, musicians, painters, all in a breath, "everything by spells, but nothing long." They smatter at all, learn thoroughly nothing. In a word they are devoid of a moral nature, possess only imperfect reasoning faculties, are unsound mentally and morally, yet are perfectly able to distinguish right from wrong, and cannot be considered intellectual maniacs.

We regret that we are unable to consider fully the condition; its relation to intellect and to instinct. We conclude our paper, with these omissions, as follows:

1. That there is, in the sense we use the term a monomania.

2. That there is an instinctive, and a reasoning or moral mania.

3. That there is an insanity without delusions.

4. That delusion is a *test of insanity* to this extent: where delusion, as we have defined it, exists, there is insanity, this is accepted by all authority; that no responsibility attaches when

an act is the offspring of delusion, and is in the line of such delusion.

5. That an individual whose delusions defy the evidence of his own senses; whose reason and judgment are incapable of correcting false perceptions or ideas resulting therefrom; whose impulses, having overpowered the will, are purely instinctive, although in all these cases there may be knowledge of right and wrong, is insane and to this extent irresponsible.

6. That knowledge of right and wrong is with this class of cases no test of responsibility.

To these conclusions we append the following views and opinions showing they accord with accepted authority.

"In *monomania* proper, and in *melancholy* we have a partial ideational insanity, with fixed delusion or delusions upon one subject or a few subjects, apart from which the patient reasons tolerably correctly. Psychologically speaking, the existence of delusion indicates fundamental disorder of mental action—*radical insanity;* secondly the delusion reacts injuriously upon other mental phenomena, interfering with correct ratiocination, or due co-ordination of functions, and predisposing to convulsive mental phenomena; and thirdly, while it cannot be subordinated to reflection, the individual may at any moment be subordinated to it, and act under its instigation."

Edmonds, *Select Cases*, Vol. i, 35, defines a *sane* man to be one:

1. Whose senses bear truthful evidence.

2. Whose understanding is capable of receiving that evidence.

3. Whose reason can draw proper conclusions from the truthful evidence thus received.

4. Whose will can guide the thought thus obtained.

5. Whose moral sense can tell the right and wrong growing out of that thought.

6. And whose act can, at his own pleasure, be in conformity with the action of all these qualities—all these unite to constitute sanity; the absence of any one of them makes insanity.

In the case of Kline, city of New York, 1845, Judge Edmonds charged the Jury that, "it must be borne in mind that the moral as well as the intellectual faculties may be so disordered by disease as to deprive the mind of its controlling power." Also, "if some controlling disease was in truth the acting power within him which he could not resist, or if he had not a sufficient use of his reason to control the passions which prompted the act complained of, he is not responsible; but we must be sure not to be misled by a mere impulse of passion, an idle, frantic humor, or unaccountable mode of action, but inquire whether it is an absolute dispossession of the free and natural agency of the human mind.

In the Hadfield case, Lord Erskine submitted the following propositions to which the Court assented:

1. That it is the reason of a man, which makes him accountable for his acts, and, that without the use of his reason he cannot be held guilty of crime.

2. That it is unnecessary that reason should be entirely subverted.

3. That a total loss of memory and reason is not required to constitute insanity.

4. Where hallucinations exist, the deed for which the accused is arraigned must be the immediate offspring either of the hallucination or of the disease of which the hallucination is a symptom."

We will close with the opinion given by Chief Justice Shaw, of Mass., in the Rogers case, (tried for murder of his keeper in prison).

"The conduct may be in many respects regular, the mind

acute, and the conduct apparently governed by rules of propriety, and at the same time, there may be *insane delusion*, by which the mind is perverted. The most common of these cases is *monomania*, when the mind broods over one idea and cannot be reasoned out of it. This may operate as the excuse for a criminal act in one or two modes; either the delusion is such that the person under its influence has a real and firm belief of some fact, not true in itself, but which if it were true, would excuse his act; as where the belief is, that the party killed had an immediate design upon his life, and under that belief, the insane man killed him in supposed self-defence.

Or secondly, where some violent outburst occurs, which taken in connection with former acts indicates that the will was overborne. The questions for them to decide were whether such a delusion existed in the mind of the accused; whether he did not act under an insane but firm belief that the diseased was going to shut him up with some dangerous design, or not for a slight punishment; whether the facts indicate that the deed was done at a moment when the delusion was uncontrollable."
